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NOTE
SCHOOL FINANCING IN OHIO
YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW:
SEARCHING FOR A "THOROUGH AND
EFFICIENT" SYSTEM OF PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
The Thorough and Efficient Clause of the Ohio Constitution
provides: "The general assembly shall make such provisions, by
taxation, or otherwise as with the income arising from the school trust
fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools
throughout the state. . ."' On December 19, 1991, five school districts,

their superintendents, members of their boards of education, and some
of the teachers, students, and parents affiliated with those school
districts filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief,
claiming that Ohio's system of funding public education was
unconstitutional under the Thorough and Efficient Clause.2 The case,
DeRolph v. State, was the start of a thirteen-year battle over school
financing in the state. Despite four Supreme Court of Ohio
declarations that the public school financing system was invalid 3 and
I OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
2

DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ohio, 1997) ("DeRolph 1').

3 Id. at 747 ("We therefore hold that Ohio's elementary and secondary public school

financing system violates Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution, which mandates a

thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state."); DeRolph v. State, 728
N.E.2d 993, 1020 (Ohio 2000) ("DeRolph 11") ("[l]t is apparent to us that, despite the past and

present efforts of Governor Taft and our General Assembly, the mandate of the Constitution has
not yet been fulfilled."); DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1200 (Ohio 2001) ("DeRolph II1")
("Despite the extensive efforts of the defendants to produce a plan that meets the requirements

announced by this court, changes to the formula are required to make the new plan
constitutional:"), vacated, DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2002); DeRolph v.
State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2002) ("DeRolph IV") ("[T]he current school-funding system

is unconstitutional.").
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a decree that plaintiffs no longer had access to Ohio courts to further
litigate the DeRolph case,4 it is still not clear how to define a
constitutionally-valid funding system in Ohio.
While the series of DeRolph decisions very clearly declared what a
"thorough and efficient" education is not, the decisions failed to
articulate a clear definition of a "thorough and efficient" education.
Further complicating the task of determining the application of the
DeRolph decisions to future litigation is the fact that only four justices
involved in the DeRolph decisions remain on the court at the time of
this writing. 5 Only two justices on the current Court were part of the
4-3 majorities declaring the school-financing system unconstitutional
in the DeRolph decisions; when Justice Resnick's term expires in
January 2007, only one member of the DeRolph majorities will
remain. 6 The other two still-sitting justices from the DeRolph courts
argued that the challenge to the General Assembly's school-financing
plan was a non-justiciable political question, and clearly stated they
would not have decided the case on the merits.7 Given both the
unclear message of the three DeRolph opinions still in force as law, as
well as the changed composition of the court, the outcome of any new
challenge to the General Assembly's enacted school-financing system
is unclear.
This paper discusses the current school-financing system and
recently proposed changes to it in light of the "thorough and efficient"
mandate of the Ohio Constitution. Part I presents a history of the
DeRolph litigation. Part II discusses how the highest courts in other
states have interpreted the meaning of similar constitutional
provisions relating to public education. Based on Ohio jurisprudence
as well as the jurisprudence from other states, this paper then offers a
working definition of "thorough and efficient." Part III describes the
school funding program in Ohio through fiscal year 2005, the
Governor's proposed changes to it, and the system put in place by the
General Assembly for fiscal year 2006-07, then applies the definition
of "thorough and efficient" derived in Part II to determine whether
any of the systems meet the working definition of "thorough and
efficient." Finally, Part IV offers some concluding thoughts.

4 See State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003) ("[W]e now grant a peremptory
writ and end any further DeRolph litigation in DeRolph v. State."), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 966
(2003).
5Only three justices from the DeRolph court will remain when Justice Resnick's term on
the Court expires in January 2007.
6 DeRolph 111 was vacated by DeRolph IV. See note 3, infra.
See DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 782 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).

2007]

SCHOOL FINANCING IN OHIO

I. THE DEROLPHDECISIONS
School finance litigation in the United States has emerged in three
distinct "waves." In the first wave, plaintiffs argued that the federal
constitution's Equal Protection Clause mandated equity in school
funding. 8 The second wave also focused on equality in spending, but
9
relied instead upon equal protection guarantees in state constitutions.
In the third wave, plaintiffs shifted the focus of litigation from
equality to adequacy, arguing that education clauses in state
constitutions required a minimum level of education for each student
and that this minimum level was not being met by the state funding
system.' 0 The DeRolph litigation was a part of the third wave.
A. DeRolph I
The boards of education of five school districts, along with their
superintendents and certain teachers, students, and next friends
affiliated with the school districts, brought suit against the State of
Ohio, the State Board of Education, the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, and the Ohio Department of Education alleging that
Ohio's system of funding public education was unconstitutional.
Ohio's system of financing public schools was a foundation-based
program, with several provisions that modified the foundation's basic
funding formula." The trial court examined the complex funding
framework and found, among other things, that the Ohio system for
funding public schools violated the Thorough and Efficient Clause of
the Ohio Constitution.12 The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court, finding that the facts in DeRolph were insufficiently
different from those in a previous Supreme Court of Ohio case where13
the constitutionality of the school funding system had been upheld.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Justice Sweeney authored the majority opinion in the 4-3 decision.
Before all else, the opinion stated that the issue of whether the school
8 For a discussion about the waves of litigation in school finance, see Michael Heise,
State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to
Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151 (1995) (discussing the concept of waves).
9 Id.
10 Id.
II A foundation program funds schools based on a formula that combines variables such
as the number of students, number of teachers, and variety of course offerings at a school. The
current version of the School Foundation Program is found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.01
(2006) et seq., and is discussed in Part Ill.
12DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 734.
13DeRolph v. State, No. CA-477, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3915 (Ohio App. 5th 1995)
(finding the general structure of the school finance system to be indistinguishable from the one
upheld in CincinnatiSch. Dist.Bd.ofEduc. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979)).
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financing system was constitutional was clearly justiciable.' 4 It then
turned to the meaning of the Thorough and Efficient Clause.
The majority looked to the history of the Ohio Constitution and the
debates surrounding its adoption, then turned to the 1923 decision
Miller v. Korns.15 In Miller, the Court first made it clear that the
school system called for by the Constitution was the responsibility of
the state, not localities or municipalities,' 6 then offered a definition of
"thorough and efficient" in terms of what it was not: "A thorough
system could not mean one in which part or any number of the school
districts of the state were starved for funds. An efficient system could
of the school districts
not mean one in which part or any number
'7
lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment."'
The DeRolph opinion then turned to the 1979 Supreme Court of
Ohio decision in Cincinnati School District Board of Education v.
Walter,'8 which again defined "thorough and efficient" in terms of
what it was not: "[A] school system would not be thorough and
efficient if 'a school district was receiving so little local and state
were effectively being deprived of
revenue that the students
19
educational opportunity.''
Looking to specific evidence from the trial record in DeRolph, the
court found that the deplorable conditions of some public school
buildings, insufficient funds to purchase basic instructional materials,
overcrowded classrooms, severely limited curricula, a lack of
technology, and poor student scores on achievement tests, among
other things, led to the "inescapable conclusion" that "Ohio's
elementary and secondary public schools are neither thorough nor
efficient." 20
The court found that there was no relation between the funding
formula and the actual cost of educating students. 21 First, the General
Assembly's method for determining the foundation formula's perstudent amount used in base payment calculations was a residual
figure, calculated after the Assembly determined how much money it
was going to allocate to primary and secondary education in the
budget. Further, wealthier school districts could secure significant
state aid, regardless of need, through categorical programs (such as
14 DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 737.
15 140 N.E. 773 (Ohio 1923).
16

DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 774 (quoting Miller v. Korns, 140 N.E. 773, 776).

17 Id. at

775.
Is 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979).
19DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 741 (quoting CincinnatiSch. Dist. Bd of Educ. v. Walter, 390
N.E.2d 813, 825).
20 Id. at 745.
21 Id.
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vocational education, special education, and transportation), and the
guarantee amount provision represented "a flaw in the system of
school funding, 22
because they work[ed] against the equalization effect
of the formula.,
Further disadvantaging poorer school districts was the problem of
"phantom revenue" resulting from the dual method of valuing
property within a school district for tax collection purposes and the
School Foundation Program charge-off calculation.23 The rate of
property valuation growth for tax purposes was artificially capped by
legislation, 24 resulting in a school district receiving the same amount
of money from tax levies before and after reappraisal of property. 25 In
calculating the charge-off in the School Foundation Program formula,
however, the newer, higher property value was used.26 This dual
method of valuing property resulted in a gap between actual revenues
the school district received and the amount the state assumed the
district received (and thus discounted from the district's total aid
package).
Ultimately, the majority identified four major factors that made
Ohio's school funding system "unworkable":
(1) the operation of the School Foundation Program, (2) the
emphasis of Ohio's school funding system on local property
tax, (3) the requirement of school district borrowing through
the spending reserve and emergency school assistance loan
programs, and (4) the lack of sufficient funding in the
General Assembly's biennium budget for the construction
and maintenance of public school buildings.27
The court struck down the corresponding provisions of the Ohio
Revised Code as unconstitutional. 28
The court declined to order a specific remedy in the case, but
instead "admonish[ed] the General Assembly that it must create an

26

Id. at 739.
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301 (Baldwin 2005).
DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 739.
Id.

27

Id. at 747.

22
23
24
25

The provisions of the Ohio Revised Code declared unconstitutional were Ohio Rev.
Code § 133.301 (granting borrowing authority to school districts); Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3313.483,
3313.487, 3313.488, 3313.489, and 3313.4810 (the emergency school assistance loan
provisions); Ohio Rev. Code § 3317.01, 3317.02, 3317.022, 3317.023, 3317.024, 3317.04,
3317.05, 3317.051, and 3317.052 (the School Foundation Program), and Ohio Rev. Code §§
3318, to the extent it was under-funded (the Classroom Facilities Act). DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at
747.
28
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entirely new school financing system., 29 The court stayed the effect
of its decision for one year, to allow time for "adequate study,
drafting of the appropriate legislation and transition from the30 present
scheme of financing to one in conformity with this decision.,
The DeRolph I majority did provide some positive language to
define "thorough and efficient": "A thorough and efficient system of
common schools includes facilities in good repair and the supplies,
materials, and funds necessary to maintain these facilities in a safe
manner, in compliance with all local, state and federal mandates. 31
Chief Justice Moyer pointed out in his dissent, however, that exactly
what the court meant by "good repair" and "necessary" remained
unclear.32
Perhaps a greater concern, however, was the emerging issue of
what role equality played in a "thorough and efficient" system of
schools-an issue to be made more obscure by later DeRolph
decisions. Exactly what level of inequality would be permitted in
school funding was unclear-the acceptable amount of inequality in
financing fell somewhere between wide disparity and exact equality.
The court took great pains to say equality was not required:
We recognize that disparities between school districts will
always exist. By our decision today, we are not stating that a
new financing system must provide equal educational
opportunities for all... We are not suggesting that funds be
diverted from wealthy districts and given to the less fortunate.
There is no "leveling down" component in our decision
today.
Moreover, in no way should our decision be construed as
imposing spending ceilings on more affluent school districts.
free to augment their programs if
School districts are still
3
they choose to do SO.
Although it took great pains to note that equality was not required, the
majority did so in the context of objecting to the school funding
formula's reliance on property taxes because it created "wide
disparities. 3 4 Further suggesting some degree of equality should be
present in a constitutional system was the court's concern that the
29

Id.

Id.
Id.
32 Id. at 791 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
33 Id at 746.
30

31

3

DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 746.
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method for funding categorical programs and the guarantee amounts
under the School Foundation Program 3worked
against "the
5
equalization effect of the foundation formula.
Also unclear from the first DeRolph decision was exactly what
level of adequacy was required under the Thorough and Efficient
Clause. One of the issues about which the court expressed concern
was that some school districts could not provide honors or advanced
placement classes to their students,36 and the court lamented that "the
system has failed to educate our youth to their fullest potential. 3 7 In
stating that "money alone is not the panacea that will transform
Ohio's school system into a model of excellence," 38 the majority
seemed to suggest that excellence was a factor in determining
whether the state's school system was "thorough and efficient."
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Resnick,
provided a very concise explanation of his view of the meaning of
"thorough and efficient":
I am also convinced that it is time for the General Assembly
to set education standards and to require performance of the
education establishment, with rewards when they meet the
standards or severe corrective action when they do not....
[E]ach district must be given school structures that are safe
and conducive to learning, including the necessary fixtures,
equipment and supplies that ensure thorough and efficient
opportunity to learn. In addition, each district must be placed
on a financial footing that permits 39the district to compete so
as to meet the prescribed standards.
Chief Justice Moyer wrote for the three dissenting justices in
DeRolph I. The dissenters stated that their position should not be
considered an endorsement of the current system of financing,4° but
concluded that "defining a 'thorough and efficient' system of
education financing is a nonjusticiable question" because it was a
"political question that the Ohio Constitution leaves to the legislature
to determine. '4 1 Chief Justice Moyer, quoting the Illinois Supreme
Court, noted that "the question of education quality is inherently one
of policy involving philosophical and practical consideration that call
Id. at 752.
Id. at 744.
37 Id.at 745.
38 Id. at 746.
39 Id.at 748 (Douglas, J., concurring).
40 DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 795 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 784 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
35
36
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' '2
for the exercise of legislative and administrative discretion A
(emphasis omitted).
Moyer's dissent also took issue with the majority's implicit
reliance on equality and adequacy. Regarding equality, the dissent
concluded that "[t]he plain language of our Education Clause, in
contrast to the language of other state constitutions, makes clear that
our Constitution does not include terms expressly requiring equality
of educational opportunity. ' 43 Moyer wrote: "We are simply unable to
stretch the commonly understood meaning of 'thorough and efficient'
to include 'equality."' 44 Regarding adequacy, the dissent stated that
"the constitutional phrase 'thorough and efficient' cannot be deemed
to impose a duty to provide a 'quality' education if the term 'quality'
is used to mean more than the basic education required by the
' 45
minimum standards formalized in the Ohio Administrative Code.
To define adequacy otherwise would require consensus as to the
purpose of education, a function that is legislative in nature.4 6
On motion for reconsideration and clarification, the Ohio Supreme
Court noted that property taxes could be used as part of a funding
solution, but could "no longer be the primary means of providing the
finances for a thorough and efficient system of schools," and that the
debt incurred by schools under the borrowing statutes declared
unconstitutional in DeRolph I remained valid.47

B. DeRolph II
The General Assembly adopted several reforms to the school
financing system in response to DeRolph I. Among them were
changes to the method of financing of capital projects; revision to the
School Foundation Program; phase-out of the borrowing structure
declared unconstitutional in DeRolph 1; the establishment of both
academic and fiscal standards for school district performance; and the
separation of the education budget from the general operating budget
42 Id. at 785 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar 672
1996)).
N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Itl.
43 Id. at 789 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
44 Id.at 790 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
45 Id.at 791 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
46 DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 785 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
47 DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997). The Court also addressed a third issue
regarding jurisdiction: the Supreme Court did not retain exclusive jurisdiction of the matter to
review the remedial legislation that was enacted in response to DeRolph I, because it was "not
the function of the judiciary to supervise or participate in the legislative and executive process."
Id. at 887. Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Lundberg Stratton dissented regarding this point,
believing that since the Supreme Court had ordered the legislature to comply with the
constitution, it should retain continuing jurisdiction over the matter. Id.at 888-89.
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of the state. 48 The state also proposed a one-cent sales tax increase to
fund schools on the May
1998 ballot, but the electorate rejected the
49
proposal in May 1998.
On remand, the trial court found the state had failed to comply
with the DeRolph I order because it had not implemented a complete,
systematic overhaul of the school funding system.5 ° The state
appealed directly to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court again split 43, to hold that the financing system was still unconstitutional. Despite
what the Court acknowledged as "a good faith attempt" to meet the
constitutional requirements in the school financing system, the
changes were not enough. 5'
Still, the court objected to the fact that even under the revised
system, after federal funding, the state contribution to public
elementary and secondary education was approximately 43.8% and
the local share was about 56.2%.52 It again focused on the reliance on
property taxes to fund the system, and the equity and adequacy
arguments that had been hinted at in Justice Sweeney's opinion in
DeRolph I resurfaced in Justice Resnick's opinion, with stronger
force. In its conclusion, the majority presented areas that warranted
"further attention, study, and development by the General
Assembly, ' 53 It also suggested that an inequitable system could not
comply with the Thorough and Efficient Clause by noting that the
failure to correct overreliance on the property tax would "make it
exceeding difficult of any system of school funding to comply with
the Thorough and Efficient Clause, since the inherent inequities will
remain., 54 The discussion of the ability of wealthier school districts to
spend additional funds above the funding formula under the
constitution essentially disappeared from the majority's opinion.
The majority's discussion of statewide standards suggested that
adequacy and the hint of high quality had become a more prominent
part of the concept of "thorough and efficient:, 55 "[W]e clearly state
that in order to have a thorough and efficient system of schools, there
must be statewide standards that are fully developed, clearly stated,
48 For detailed discussion of the changes and their effects, see sections II and III of the
DeRolph 1H majority opinion: DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1003-20.
49 Id. at 1015.
50DeRolph v. State, 712 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 1998).
51DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1020.
52 Id. at 999. Including the federal share of 6%, the state share was 41.2% and the local
share was slightly more than half, at 52.8%.
53 Id. at 1021.

5 Id. at 1021.
55Id. at 1002 (stating that the objective of the General Assembly was to achieve "a
statewide thorough and efficient system of schools that is adequately funded and that has
statewide standards for success").
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and understood by educators, students and parents. 56 The court
clearly felt that the standards that had been put in place by the
legislature after DeRolph I were not sufficient, and spoke of the need
for "higher academic standards," but did not articulate exactly what
those standards should be.57
As in DeRolph I, the court declined to put forth a specific
definition of the Thorough and Efficient Clause. It again noted that
"thoroughness and efficiency embrace far more than simply adequate
funding, 58 but noted that
it is impossible to generate an all-inclusive list that
specifically enumerates every possible component of a
through and efficient system. In light of this, we offer the
following guidance: A thorough system means that each and
every school district has enough funds to operate. An
efficient system is one in which each and every school district
in the state has an ample number of teachers, sound buildings
that are in compliance with state fire and building codes, and
equipment sufficient for all students to be afforded an
educational opportunity.59
Like the definitions of "thorough" and "efficient" the court had
adopted from Miller v. Korns in DeRolph I, the definition presented in
the majority opinion contained vague expressions that left the court's
meaning unclear. The court failed to specify what "enough funds to
operate" meant, or what programs the school needed to operate in
determining the funds required (did it need to provide honors and
advanced placement programs?), or what comprised "an ample
number of teachers" or "equipment sufficient for all students to be
afforded an educational opportunity." One specific mandate regarding
equipment did emerge later in the opinion:
We are still a long way from the goal of providing sufficient
computers to allow a high quality education in this computer
age. Moreover, there is no specific program in place to
provide computers for students above the fifth grade level.
This is a crucial need60 so that students nearing graduation will
be computer-literate.
Id. at 1019.
57 DeRolph 11, 728 N.E.2d at 1022.
56

58 Id. at 1001.
59 Id.

60 Id at 1020-21 (emphasis added).
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Again the concept of high quality appeared in the majority decision.
In DeRolph I, Justice Sweeney had only alluded to the idea that
6
excellence was a component of a "thorough and efficient" system. 1
In DeRolph II, however, Justice Resnick wrote as if high quality were
a defacto part of the definition of "thorough and efficient."
That the definition of "thorough and efficient" was elusive and
seemed to encompass some unexplained vision of the majority was
not a point lost on the dissenting justices. Chief Justice Moyer again
penned the dissenting opinion. After repeating that the issue was
nonjusticiable,6 2 the chief justice took the majority to task for its
failure to sufficiently define "thorough and efficient."
The majority still has not clearly told the General Assembly
what "thorough and efficient" means, or what "overreliance"
on property tax is, or what would constitute the kind of
educational opportunity it believes the Ohio Constitution
guarantees to every Ohio child. Instead, the majority today
tells the General Assembly once again to go back to the
drawing board, while not describing in a meaningful way
what the final design must look like.

[I]n attempting to clarify the ambiguous phrase "thorough
and efficient," the majority merely substitutes additional
ambiguous and subjective criteria. Whether a district has
"enough" funds, or an "ample" number of teachers, is in the
eye of the beholder.63
...

Chief Justice Moyer further criticized the majority for its emphasis
on adequacy and equality, issues the dissenting justices argued were
not requirements of Ohio's Thorough and Efficient Clause. "IT]he
majority opinion more than once suggests that the fundamental
problem with property tax funding is that it creates inequities. Yet this
court has previously expressly rejected the contention that the Ohio
Constitution mandates equal educational opportunity throughout the
state." 64 Regarding adequacy, the chief justice noted that the court
61See DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d at 744 (majority notes with concern that some school
districts could not provide honors or advanced placement classes to their students); id. at 745
(majority laments that "the system has failed to educate our youth to their fullest potential.");
and id.at 768 (majority observes that "money alone is not the panacea that will transform
Ohio's school system into a model of excellence").
62 DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1029 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
63Id. at 1030-31.
64Id.at 1032-33.
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was substituting its own concept of quality for the judgment of the
elected representatives of the people: "The majority is really saying
that it does not think the minimum educational standards now in place
are high enough, thereby substituting its65own judgment of educational
sufficiency for constitutional analysis."
Instead of remanding to the trial court, the court maintained
jurisdiction over the DeRolph case, continuing the matter for 13
months.
C. DeRolph I
In June 2001, the DeRolph litigants returned to the Supreme Court
to argue the validity of the Ohio funding system as revised by the
General Assembly in the prior year. Since the DeRolph H decision,
the General Assembly had implemented further changes in the
education funding system. These changes included substantially
revising the funding formula for the base cost of providing an
adequate education by deriving the figure from the cost incurred by
"model" school districts that were meeting at least a minimum
number of performance standards established by the General
Assembly; phasing in new "parity aid" payments to poorer districts to
permit discretionary spending on programs such as honors programs;
and further developing programs to fund facilities improvements.66
The members of the court realigned in the DeRolph 111 decision:
Justices Douglas and Pfeifer, who had been in the majority in
DeRolph I and II, joined with Chief Justice Moyer and Justice
Lundberg Stratton, who had dissented from the earlier rulings to
create a new working majority, while Justice Cook, who had been in
the minority before, and Justices Sweeney and Resnick, who had
written the lead opinions in the prior decisions, dissented. Chief
Justice Moyer authored the majority opinion. The Court held, with
three specific modifications to the foundation formula to determine
the cost of providing an adequate education 67 and full funding of the
parity aid program in fiscal year 2003 (as opposed to proposed the
phase-in through fiscal year 2006), the school financing system would
Id.at 1033 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
For detailed discussion of the changes and their effects, see section 11of the DeRolph III
majority opinion: DeRolph 111.
754 N.E.2d at 1191-98.
67 Under the formula studied by the court, some school districts that only achieved 18 or
19 objectives could count as districts that had achieved at least 20 standards ("model" school
districts); the wealthiest and poorest model schools were eliminated from the model school
districts sample used to determine costs; and an "echo effect" adjustment was made to model
school budgets that spent above what the state thought was actually needed to meet standards.
The Court ordered all three of these adjustments be eliminated from the formula, as all likely
reduced the formula amount. id. at 1200-01.
65
66
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be constitutional.68 The court ordered implementation of the
modifications to the base cost formula and full funding for the parity
aid program, and relinquished jurisdiction of the case, noting that "[i]f
the order receives less than full compliance, interested parties have
remedies available to them., 69 In a vitriolic dissent, Justice Resnick
termed this decision a "Machiavellian maneuver to halt this
litigation ' 70 and faulted the majority because it "acquiesced to the
desires of the defendants, and ha[d] abandoned all pretense of
objectivity, ostensibly in the spirit of creating a consensus.",71 She was
especially critical of the majority's willingness to specify the
legislative action necessary to make the system constitutional, noting
that the prior DeRolph decisions had been very careful not to direct
the General Assembly to take specific action because it was not the
Court's role to legislate.72 Because school funding was a complicated
and intricate process, the court needed to be wary that any change to
one aspect could have a "ripple effect" and unintended consequences
that the justices did not anticipate.73
Justice Resnick argued that the prior DeRolph decisions had
required a "complete systematic overhaul" of the system and that the
state had failed correct the problems identified in the prior DeRolph
decisions. Her dissent, like the majority opinion in DeRolph II,
suggested adequacy and equity were inherent in the concept of
"thorough and efficient" by noting that the majority had "set[ ] the bar
lower than is justified" in declaring the system constitutional pending
implementation of the Court's modifications.7 4 Arguing that the Ohio
Constitution "envisions much more than a school system that barely
meets the minimum needs of its pupils, '75 and suggesting that
advance placement courses for high school students and foreign
language opportunities in elementary schools were minimum inputs
to determine a model school,76 Justice Resnick viewed the majority's
decision as "knelling defeat for the students and citizens of Ohio. 77
Returning to the equality concepts advanced in the discussion of
property taxes in DeRolph I and DeRolph II, Justice Resnick
complained that "[w]hile the 'adjustments' imposed by the majority
68

Id.

69 Id. at
70 Id. at

1201.
1216 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 1217.
72 DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1218.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1218.
75 Id. at 1219.
76 Id. at 1233.
77

Id. at 1219.
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do increase somewhat the total state education spending package
above the [General Assembly's budget] level, those adjustments do
7 8 Justice Resnick joined
nothing to rectify the inherent disparities."
Justice Sweeney's dissent, which was even more explicit about the
equality requirement suggested by the prior DeRolph decisions: "The
hallmark of a thorough and efficient form of public education is that it
works as well
for the least advantaged as it does for the most
79
advantaged.,
D. DeRolph IV
One month after the court issued its decision in DeRolph III, the
state brought a motion to reconsider the decision because "changes to
the base cost of the formula ordered by the court. . . 'may have been
based in part upon erroneous calculations and data.' ' 80 In a 4-3
decision split along the same lines as the DeRolph III decision, the
majority granted the motion to reconsider, but first ordered the parties
to a settlement conference. When the parties failed to reach
agreement, the court ruled on the merits of the case on
reconsideration, and issued a decision vacating DeRolph IlI.
In a change of the court's "collective mind,"'', the majority from
DeRolph I and DeRolph II realigned in DeRolph IV to overturn the
DeRolph III decision, finding the funding system unconstitutional.
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment only. Justice Pfeifer, who
had been a member of the majority in all three previous DeRolph
decisions, wrote the plurality opinion.
The plurality returned to "the core constitutional directive of
DeRolph I 'a complete systematic overhaul' of the school-funding
system," and found that because there had not been such an overhaul,
the system remained unconstitutional.8 2 The court then issued its
order: "(w)e direct the general assembly to enact a school-funding
scheme that is thorough and efficient, as explained in DeRolph I,

DeRolph 11, 754 N.E.2d at 1225 (emphasis added).
79 Id. at 1244 (Sweeney, J., dissenting). As he had in the prior decisions, Justice Cook

78

continued to maintain that the school funding dispute was nonjusticiable, stating: "I continue to
believe that this cause presents a nonjusticiable political question ....
The term 'thorough and
efficient' speaks to the question of educational quality, which is an issue that unquestionably
involves difficult policy choices and value judgments that courts are not in the business of
making." Id. at 1244-45.
90 DeRolph v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1113, 1113 (Ohio 2001).

81 DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530.
82 Id.
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83 The court
DeRolph II, and the accompanying concurrences."
84
dispute.
DeRolph
relinquished jurisdiction over the
That the plurality suggested the accompanying concurrences in the
first two DeRolph decisions carried the force of law did not sit well
with the Chief Justice: "I certainly do not believe that the opinions of
individual members of the court as reflected in separate concurrences
are binding in any litigation that may follow today's decision., 85 In
response to the plurality's return to the "complete overhaul"
requirement, Chief Justice Moyer's dissent returned to criticism of the
plurality's vague directives and unexplained vision of a "thorough
and efficient" system of public schools, arguing that "the majority
today issue[d] an opinion that ignores as many questions as it
decided., 86 Noting that the opinions in DeRolph I and DeRolph II did
not provide the General Assembly with "clear guidance," the Chief
Justice targeted the discussion of "overreliance": "The majority has
yet to define what it means by 'overreliance' on property tax, and
Ohio's policymakers are left to wonder, 'If the percentage of local to
state funding were inverted would that be sufficient, or is 87
the majority
seeking only a fifty-one-percent reliance on state funds?'
The questions about the definition of "thorough and efficient" will
remain unanswered in terms of DeRolph litigation. When the
plaintiffs returned to trial court to attempt to gain judicial oversight
over the General Assembly's revision process, the state requested a
writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from ruling on the issue.8 8
The court granted the writ, noting that because it had relinquished
jurisdiction in DeRolph IV, the plaintiffs could not further pursue the
issue in any Ohio court.89

83 Id. (emphasis added).
84 Though the court did not explicitly state that it was relinquishing jurisdiction the
Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Lewis, found that no court had jurisdiction over the DeRolph
dispute:
We crafted our language in the DeRolph IV mandate to order that the trial court
"carry this judgment into execution." We did not remand the cause for further
proceedings. In fact, if we had intended a remand for further proceedings in this
litigation, we would have expressly provided for that action. By contrast, we did not
specify any remand in DeRolph IV. (citations omitted)[A] review of the various
opinions in DeRolph IV supports our construction that no further jurisdiction over
that particular case would be exercised, whether by this or any other court.
789 N.E.2d 195, 202-03, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 966 (2003).
85 DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 537 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 536.
87 Id. at 537.
88 Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195.
89 Id. at 202 ("[A] review of the various opinions in DeRolph IV supports our construction
that no further jurisdiction over that particular case would be exercised, whether by this or any

other court.").
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II. INTERPRETATIONS OF "THOROUGH AND EFFICIENT" FROM OTHER
STATES

With little positive definition of "thorough and efficient" emerging
from Ohio jurisprudence, the examples of other states could be useful
to future litigants, courts, and policy-makers in defining what a
"thorough and efficient" system in Ohio should look like. Sixteen
other state constitutions require either "thorough and efficient,"
"efficient," or "thorough" school systems. To the extent that their
courts have considered the meaning of these terms, their examples are
instructive in developing a general definition of "thorough and
efficient." This section examines the decisions of the other states in
which the courts have defined the requirements of either "thorough
and efficient" together or "thorough" and "efficient" separately.
A. States with "Thorough and Efficient" Clauses
Seven other states have a provision for "thorough and efficient"
education systems in their constitutions: Maryland, 90 Minnesota, 91
New Jersey,92 Pennsylvania, 3 South Dakota,9 4 West Virginia,95 and
Wyoming. 96 The highest courts in five of these states have discussed
the meaning of "thorough and efficient" in the context
of the
97
legislature's obligation to provide a public school system.
90"The General Assembly, at its First Session afler the adoption of this Constitution, shall
by Law establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools;
and shall provide by taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance." MD. CONST. art. VIII, §
1(2004).
91 "The legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a
thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout the state." MINN. CONST. art. XIII,
§1 (2004).
92"The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between
the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, 1 (2005).
93"The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough
and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth." PA. CONST.
art. 3, § 14 (2004).
94 "The Legislature shall make such provision by general taxation and by authorizing the
school corporations to levy such additional taxes as with the income from the permanent school
fund shall secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state." S.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 15 (2003).
95 "The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of
free schools." W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (2004).
96The legislature shall make such further provision by taxation or otherwise, as with the
income arising from the general school fund will create and maintain a thorough and efficient
system of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the state, between the
ages of six and twenty-one years, free of charge..." WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 9 (2004).
97 The Supreme Court of South Dakota has not issued judgment on the meaning of its
"thorough and efficient" education requirement. The Supreme Court of Minnesota briefly
discussed West Virginia's meaning of "thorough and efficient" in reaching the conclusion that
the funding system in place did not violate the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution,
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Two of the courts provided cursory discussions of "thorough and
efficient" that were tangential to the issues upon which they
ultimately decided the cases before them. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania ultimately decided the issue of whether the legislature's
school financing system was "thorough and efficient" was
nonjusticiable.98 In reaching that conclusion, however, it rejected the
notion that "thorough and efficient" could be defined in terms of
equal funding per pupil.99
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming decided the state
financing scheme was unconstitutional because it did not provide
substantially equalized funding, in violation of the "complete and
uniform system of public instruction" mandate of its Constitution,
obviating the need to rule on the issue of whether the system was
"thorough and efficient. ' ° Still, in its decision, the court offered a
lexically based definition of a "'thorough and efficient" system as one
that "is marked by full detail or complete in all respects and
productive without waste and is reasonably sufficient for the
appropriate or suitably teaching/education/learning of the state's
school age children."''
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia offered its
definition of "thorough and efficient" in Pauley v. Kelly. 10 2 The
decision included a lengthy discussion of the origins of "thorough and
efficient" mandates for public education in West Virginia and Ohio,
as well as a review of the jurisprudence in 15 states on the meaning of
"thorough and efficient" together, and "thorough" and "efficient"
separately, as they related to the legislative requirement to provide
public schools, then turned to the dictionary definitions of "thorough"
and "efficient." With the history of the constitution, other states'
jurisprudence, and dictionary definitions established, the court
defined a thorough and efficient system of schools as one that
"develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the minds,
bodies, and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful
and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so
economically."' 0 3 Perhaps realizing that this definition did not provide

but focused on the "general and uniform system" requirement in its reasoning, as it was the
focus of plaintiff's complaint. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
98Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Pa. 1999), accord Danson v.
Casey, 484 Pa. 415 (Pa. 1979).
99Marrero,739 A.2d. at 112-13.
100 Campbell Co. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995).
1

' Id. at 1258-59.

1-255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
103Id. at 877.
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very manageable standards, the court then articulated specific
standards:
Legally recognized elements in this definition are
development in every child to his or her capacity of (1)
literacy; (2) ability to add, subtract, multiply and divide
numbers; (3) knowledge of government to the extent that the
child will be equipped as a citizen to make informed choices
among persons and issues that affect his own governance; (4)
self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her total
environment to allow the child to intelligently choose life
work-to know his or her options; (5) work-training and
advanced academic training as the child may intelligently
choose; (6) recreational pursuits; (7) interests in all creative
arts, such as music, theatre, literature, and the visual arts; (8)
social ethics, both behavioral and abstract, to facilitate
compatibility [sic] with others in this society.
Implicit are supportive services: (1) good physical facilities,
instructional materials and personnel; (2) careful state and
local supervision to prevent waste and
to monitor pupil,
104
competency.
administrative
and
teacher
The court then noted that the Thorough and Efficient Clause of the
West Virginia Constitution required the development of "high
quality" standards, and that the standards should comprise part of the
test against which the education system would be tested for
constitutional compliance.10 5 The court noted that individual school
districts' failure to meet the standards would not automatically mean
the education system as a whole was unconstitutional-the court
would look to whether the failure was the result of inefficiency and
noncompliance with existing
school statutes before declaring the
06
unconstitutional.1
system
West Virginia's decision in Pauley was one of many state cases
considered by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Hornbeck v.
07
Somerset County Board of Education.1
After reviewing the history
of Maryland's constitutional clause, the court reviewed the decisions
of the highest courts in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Colorado, New York,
Oregon, Idaho, Georgia, New Jersey, and West Virginia. In light of
14 Id.

105Id. at 878.
d.
76

1- 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983).
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the state's own history and the interpretations from other states, the
court concluded that the provisions of Maryland's education clause at
most required the legislature "to establish such a system, effective in
all school districts, as will provide the State's youth with a basic
public school education."' 0 8 The "basic" education was defined by
Maryland laws and the State Board of Education's regulations that set
forth "statewide qualitative standards that governed all facets of the
educational process in the State's public elementary and secondary
schools."' 0 9 Further, the Thorough and Efficient Clause did not
require uniform spending across districts. The constitution did not,
"either explicitly or implicitly, inhibit local subdivisions from
spending locally generated tax revenues for public school purposes in
supplementation of amounts to be received from the state school
fund."" 0 So long as a basic education was fully funded for each
student, the funding system was constitutional."'
The Supreme Court of New Jersey originally reached a similar
conclusion in Abbott v. Burke," 2 noting that "equalization is
constitutionally required only up to a certain level-that necessary to
achieve a thorough and efficient education-and . . .districts may
exceed that level...,, 3 The court began its evaluation of the school
system by reviewing its past decisions, and noting that in general, a
thorough and efficient education provided "that educational
opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a
child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor
market."' 14 The court then looked to the standards outlined in the
Public School Education Act of 1975 and the Board of Education's
rules to implement it, and determined that they provided sufficient
definition for a thorough and efficient system:
The Act defines thorough and efficient education on a
statewide basis as including: (a) establishment of educational
goals at both the state and local levels; (b) encouragement of
public involvement in goal-setting; (c) instruction intended to
produce the attainment of reasonable levels of proficiency in
the basic communications and computational skills; (d) a
breadth of program offerings designed to develop the
individual talents and abilities of pupils; (e) programs and
108Id. at 776.
ID91d. at 780.

"Old at 776.
ll Id.
112575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
13Id.at 395.
1141d. at 372 (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973)).
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supportive services for all pupils especially those who are
educationally disadvantaged or who have special educational
needs; (f) adequately equipped, sanitary, and secure physical
facilities and adequate materials and supplies; (g) qualified
instructional and other personnel; (h) efficient administrative
procedures; (i) an adequate State program of research and
development; and 6) evaluation and monitoring programs at
both the state and local levels." 5
The court noted, however, that the Act and the corresponding
educational system had not created a thorough and efficient education
in specific school districts ("Abbott Districts") because poorer
students could not compete with relatively advantaged students in the
labor market." 6 The court looked to curriculum offerings and found
that technology, science, foreign-language, music, art, and physical
education programs were vastly superior in wealthier districts than
they were in the Abbott Districts. It ultimately expanded the general
definition of "thorough and efficient" it had cited at the start of the
decision:
Thorough and efficient means more than teaching the skills
needed to compete in the labor market, as critically important
as that may be. It means being able to fulfill one's role as a
citizen, a role that encompasses far more than merely
registering to vote. It means the ability to participate fully in
society, in the life of one's community, the ability to
appreciate music, art, and
literature, and the ability to share
17
all of that with friends.'
The court ordered a "leveling up" of the per-pupil funding in Abbott
Districts to match per-pupil spending in the property-richest districts.
It did not, however, require that funding for every school8 district in
the state be matched to the property-rich district average."
B. States with "Thorough" or "Efficient" Requirements
The term "thorough" or "efficient" is used to describe the school
systems to be established by the legislature in the Constitutions of
eight states. "Efficient" is the sole requirement for the free public

1

Id.at 390.

116d at 372.
117
Id.at 397.

'S Abbott, 575 A.2d at 409.
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school systems in Kentucky

19

and Texas, 120 and "efficient"

is

combined with other descriptors in the requirements for public
schools set forth in the Arkansas, 12' Delaware, 122 Florida, 23 and
Illinois124 constitutions. "Thorough" is a conjunctive26 requirement for
25
the public school systems in Colorado and Idaho.1
In Kentucky, Texas, and Arkansas, the highest courts have ruled
on the meaning of the constitutional requirement of an "efficient"
education. In Illinois, the court refused to rule on the merits of the
school financing issue, finding it to be a nonjusticiable political
question. 27 The highest courts in Delaware and Florida have not
issued a ruling regarding the meaning of "efficient"128in light of the
duty of the legislature to provide a system of schools.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Rose v. Council for Better
Education, 129 found that the public school funding system failed to
comply with the "efficient" requirement of the Kentucky
119"The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system
of common
schools throughout the State." KY. CONST. § 183 (2004).
20
1 ,"A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties
and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make
suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free
schools." TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (2004).
121"Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a free and
good government, the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free
public schools and shall adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and
opportunities of education." ARK. CONST. art. 14, §1 (2005).
122"The General Assembly shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a
general and efficient system of free public schools, and may require by law that every child, not
physically or mentally disabled, shall attend the public school, unless educated by other means."
DEL. CONST. art X, §1 (2005).
123"Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and
high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education
and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and
other public education programs that the needs of the people may require." FLA. CONST. art. IX,
§1 (amended 2007).
124"The state shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational
institutions and services." ILL. CONST., art. X, §1 (2004).
125"The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and
maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state,
wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be
educated gratuitously." COLO. CONST. art. IX, §2 (2004).
126"The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the
intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish and
maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools." IDAHO
CONST. art. IX, § 1 (2004).
127Comm.

for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996).
Supreme Court of Florida had found, prior to the 2004 Constitutional Amendment
adding "efficient, safe, secure, and high quality" to the requirement that the public school
system be "uniform," that the issue of whether the school system was uniform and adequate was
nonjusticiable. Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400
(Fla. 1996).
129790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
128The
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Constitution. The court, resting its decision in large part on the
Supreme Court of West Virginia's opinion in Pauley, chose to
articulate the definition of an "efficient" education in terms of
specific standards, as well. It first described the goal of an efficient
education system in terms of a goal of providing an adequate
education for every student:
[An] efficient system of education must have as its goal to
provide each child with at least the seven following
capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills
to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic,
social, and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of
governmental processes to enable the student to understand
the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation;
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the
arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural
and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation
for advanced training in academic or vocational fields so as to
enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently;
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to
enable public school students to compete favorably with their
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics, or in the job
market. "3
Then, the court described the elements of an efficient system:
The essential, and minimal, characteristics of an "efficient"
system of common schools, may be summarized as follows:
(1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of
common schools in Kentucky is the sole
responsibility of the General Assembly.
(2) Common schools shall be free to all.
(3) Common schools shall be available to all
Kentucky children.
(4) Common schools shall be substantially uniform
throughout the state.
MId.at 212.
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(5) Common schools shall provide equal educational
opportunities to all Kentucky children, regardless of
place of residence or economic circumstances.
(6) Common schools shall be monitored by the
General Assembly to assure that they are operated
with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement,
and with no political influence.
(7) The premise for the existence of common schools
is that all children in Kentucky have a constitutional
right to an adequate education.
(8) The General Assembly shall provide funding
which is sufficient to provide each child in Kentucky
an adequate education.
(9) An adequate education is one which has as its
goal the development
of the seven capacities recited
31
previously.1
The court instructed the General Assembly to re-create a new public
school system,
in accordance with the court's definition of
32
"efficient."'

Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee 33 addressed an
Arkansas mandate that the state "maintain a general, suitable, and
efficient system of free public schools."' 134 Noting that the General
Assembly had incorporated much of Kentucky's Rose decision into
its legislation defining "efficient," the Supreme Court of Arkansas
found that General Assembly had "partially addressed what an
adequate education in Arkansas would entail."' 135 Specifically, the
Assembly's legislation required students be competent in English,
mathematics, science, and social studies, and acquire practical
knowledge (such as computer science and basic economics) that
would prepare them for working. 36 Whether the students had
achieved these goals was to be measured by tests defined by the State
Department of Education. That agency, however, had declined to
implement any standards or testing regime.' 37 The court ultimately
131Id. at 212-13.
132Id. at

212.
13391 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002) ("Lake View lP').
134ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1 (2005).
135Lake View II1, 91 S.W.3d at 486.
136
Id. at 487.
137Id.
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held that the public school system was unconstitutional and explained
the actions necessary to ensure compliance with the constitutional
mandate:
It is the State's responsibility, first and foremost, to develop
forthwith what constitutes an adequate education in Arkansas.
It is, next, the State's responsibility to assess, evaluate, and
monitor, not only the lower elementary grades for English
and math proficiency, but the entire spectrum of public
education across the state to determine whether equal
educational opportunity for an adequate education is being
substantially afforded to Arkansas' school children. It is,
finally, the State's responsibility to know how state revenues
are being spent and whether true equality in opportunity is
being achieved. Equality of educational opportunity must
include as basic components substantially equal curricula,
substantially equal facilities, and substantially equal
equipment for obtaining an adequate education. The key to all
what comprises an adequate
this, to repeat, is to determine
1 38
education in Arkansas.'
The decision was remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme
Court of Arkansas did not substantively address the issue in a later
appeal, merely noting that an "efficient" system required only
equality in funding to the extent that each school district was able to
districts could exceed the base
provide an adequate education; school
39
spending amounts if they so chose. 1
This sentiment was echoed by the Supreme Court of Texas in
Edgewood Independent School District v. Meno: 140 "As long as
efficiency is maintained, it is not unconstitutional for districts to
supplement their programs with local funds."' 41 In finding plaintiffs
had failed to produce enough evidence to support their claim that the
Texas public school system was unconstitutionally inefficient, the
court recognized two dimensions to the constitutional requirement:
financial efficiency and qualitative efficiency. Qualitative efficiency
was a "general diffusion of knowledge," which the legislature had
sufficiently defined by implementing academic accreditation
standards.' 42 Financial efficiency required that districts "have
138Id. at 500.
139Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, ("Lake View

2004).
14917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995).
41
1 Jd. at 732.
142Id. at

730.

IV"'), 189 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Ark.
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substantially equal access to funding up to the legislatively defined
level that achieves the constitutional mandate of a general diffusion of
knowledge.' 43 The court also found that the constitutional
requirement for an efficient education implicitly required proper
facilities and equipment. 44
The meaning of "thorough" has been examined by the highest
courts in both Colorado and Idaho. In Lujan v. ColoradoState Board
of Education 45 the Supreme Court of Colorado simply stated that the
"thorough and uniform" clause of the constitution was "satisfied if
thorough and uniform educational opportunities are available through
state action in each school district."' 46 It only offered slight
clarification: "'thorough and uniform' does not require complete
47
equality in the sense of providing free textbooks to all students";
"'uniform' means a pupil residing in a district without a high school
is entitled to attend a high school in another district at the former
district's expense"; 148 and the thorough and uniform clause did not
prevent local school districts from providing additional educational
49
opportunities beyond the minimum constitutional standard. 1
In Idaho, the constitution requires that the legislature create a
"general, uniform, and thorough system of public, free common
schools."' 150 Unlike most other states, it was actually the legislature
that defined the meaning of "thorough":
A thorough system of public schools in Idaho is one in which:
(1) A safe environment conducive to learning is
provided;
(2) Educators are empowered to maintain classroom
discipline;
(3) The basic values of honesty, self-discipline,
unselfishness, respect for authority and the central
importance of work are emphasized;

Id.
I"Id.at 725.
145649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
l6Id. at 1025.
1471d. at 1025 (citing Marshall v. Sch. Dist. RE # 3 R. 10.2.1(f), 553 P.2d 784 (Colo.
1976)).
148Id. (citing Duncan v. People ex. rel. Moser, 299 P. 1060 (Colo. 1931), and Hotchkiss v.
Montrose Co. High Sch. Dist., 273 P. 652 (Colo. 1914)).
149Id.
I50 IDAHO CONST. art. IX § 1 (2006).
143
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(4) The skills necessary to communicate effectively
are taught;
(5) A basic curriculum necessary to enable students
or professional-technical
academic
to
enter
postsecondary educational programs is provided;
(6) The skills necessary for students to enter the
work force are taught;
(7) The students
technology; and,

are

introduced

to

current

(8) The importance of students acquiring the skills to
enable them to be responsible citizens of their homes,
schools and communities is emphasized. 51
The legislature's definition was supplemented by the executive
branch's development of academic standards. Because the challenge
before the Supreme Court of Idaho in Idaho Schools for Equal
Educational Opportunity v. State' 52 specifically dealt with whether
the state was required to fund a safe environment conducive to
learning exclusive of property taxes, the court only examined the
legislature's definition in cursory fashion, noting that it had
previously reviewed the definition and found it satisfactory, and it
remained so.153
C. A Working Definition of "Thorough and Efficient"
Although the Ohio Supreme Court chose to define "thorough and
efficient" in negative terms, it is possible to craft a positive definition
of "thorough and efficient" looking at the common themes that
emerge in all the state court discussions of thoroughness and
efficiency as they relate to the legislative duty to provide a public
school system. These themes suggest a working definition of
"thorough and efficient."
First, the constitutional requirement that the legislature provide a
"thorough and efficient" system of public schools is a mandate that
the legislature provide a statewide system-evidence of only a few
"failing" districts does not appear to render the legislative funding
scheme unconstitutional. With the exception of New Jersey, in all the
1 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1612 (Michie 2006).
152
976 P.2d 913 (Id. 1998).
153Id. at 920.
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states discussed above, the financing system was examined in light of
overall structure rather than the results of individual districts.
Related is the idea that if the system of schools must be a statewide
one, then funding the system is the state's responsibility. While
legislatures may require local subdivisions to share funding
responsibility through local tax provisions, the state must ensure that
all subdivisions receive at least the cost of a basic or "base" education
for each pupil.
Although the state must equalize to the cost of a base education, a
thorough and efficient system requires equality of spending only to
the extent that a base education is provided for each student. School
districts with adequate means may spend beyond the base amount if
they so choose. A showing of inequality in spending is not sufficient
to find the legislative funding scheme unconstitutional.
If the level of funding is determined by a "base" education, then an
established definition of a "base" education also becomes a necessary
part of a "thorough and efficient" education. Courts agree that a
"base" education is one that prepares students to interact as workers,
citizens, and members of a community. Inherent in this theme is the
idea that there are minimum quality standards associated with a
"thorough and efficient" education. These standards should be
defined by articulated academic standards.
Articulated academic standards should, at a minimum, include
targets for math, reading, writing, science, and civics. These standards
are most preferably set by the legislature or the executive departments
responsible for education, but may be set by the courts, as in the cases
of West Virginia and Kentucky.
Finally, a "thorough and efficient" education entails not just
meeting academic standards, but also providing safe facilities in
which students can learn.
III. APPLICATION OF THE POSITIVE STANDARD FOR "THOROUGH AND
EFFICIENT" TO OHIO

Given this positive standard for "thorough and efficient," does the
current Ohio financing system and proposed changes to it satisfy the
Thorough and Efficient Clause of the Ohio Constitution? First, this
Part describes the current funding system. Then, it turns to Governor
Taft's Blue Ribbon Commission and his biennium budget proposal,
and examines the anticipated effects of the budget on Ohio school
districts. After discussing the systems, it looks to the positive
"thorough and efficient" standard developed above, and discusses
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whether Ohio's funding is and would be constitutional using the
positive standard.
A. Ohio's CurrentSystem. The FoundationProgram
The current version of the Foundation Formula is found in Ohio
Revised Code Chapter 3317. To be eligible to receive funds, a school
district must levy at least twenty mills for operating expenses, 154 and
must meet minimum operating hour requirements 5 5 and minimum
teachers' salaries guidelines. 156 This section describes the funding
formula that was in effect prior to June 30, 2005; the newly enacted
funding formula, which will control school funding in Fiscal Year
("FY") 2006 and FY 2007, is briefly outlined in section D below.
Determining the amount of funds a school is eligible for under the
Foundation Program begins with establishing the cost of an adequate
education (the "formula amount"), 157 which the General Assembly
found to be $4,814 per pupil in FY 2002.158 The General Assembly
adjusted the formula amount by projected inflation at 2.8% in FY
2003, and 2.2% in fiscal years 2004 and 2005.159 To determine the
cost of an adequate education, the General Assembly calculated the
average cost per student for school districts that met twenty of
twenty-seven performance indicators 160 subject to a rounding
procedure 16 1 (the same rounding procedure the court disapproved in
DeRolph JJI162). The average figure excluded data from schools that
were among the highest or lowest five percent in income, 163 as well as
data from schools that164
were among the highest or lowest five percent
in per-pupil spending.

The base cost funding allocated to a school district is calculated
from the following formula:

OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 3317.01(A) (West 2005).
155OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.01(B) (West 2005).
156OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.01 (C) (West 2005).
157The base figure excludes the costs of capital, costs paid by federal funds, programs
15

funded by disadvantaged pupil aid, transportation, and cost of doing business factors. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.012(B) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
8
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.012(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
159Id.

160
The performance indicators set forth graduation and attendance rates and minimum
percentages of students in the fourth, sixth, ninth, tenth, and twelfth grades that score

"proficient" on standardized mathematics, reading, writing, citizenship, and science tests. OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3317.012(B)(l)(a)-(aa) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
161SEE

162 754

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.012(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).

N.E.2d 1184, 1200 (Ohio 2001).
163OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.012(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
164OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.012(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
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(CODBfactor x formula
amount x formula ADA)
65
recognized valuation)

- (0.023 x

where the CODB factor is a cost of doing business factor created to
alleviate the differences in costs between school districts;1 66 the

formula amount is the average cost of providing an adequate
education described above;167 the formula ADM is the average daily

membership of the school district; 6' and the recognized valuation is
the value of the property recognized169under foundation formula
guidelines set forth in the Revised Code.
The second quantity in the foundation program formula above is
referred to as the "charge-off amount," which represents the portion

of education costs the state assumes a school district collects from
property taxes. Due to other provisions in the Ohio Revised Code,

however, it is possible that the formula charge-off amount is greater
than the amount a school district can actually collect from its
levies. 170 This phenomenon is called "phantom revenue."' 7' To

alleviate the phantom revenue problem, the foundation formula
provides for the issuance of gap aid, which adjusts the charge-off
amount to
equal that which was actually collected by the school
17 2
district.

Once the base cost funding for a district is determined, the figure is
then adjusted to the specific vocational, special education, and
transportation needs of each school district. Base cost funding is also

adjusted for districts where more than 25 percent of property is taxexempt;

73

165OHIO

according to incentives focused on decreasing student-

REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.022(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.02(N) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.02(B) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
16 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.02(D)(1) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003). The formula
ADM is an adjusted average daily attendance figure.
169The recognized valuation is comprised of all the property taxed in the prior year
("carryover property") and any new property added to the school district. If a county in which
the school district is located has reappraised values in any of the preceding three years, the
increased valuation is incrementally added to the recognized valuation for Foundation Program
purposes. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.015 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003). For a
general discussion of tax reduction factors and recognized valuation, see 1 KIMBALL H. CAREY,
ANDERSON'S OHIO SCHOOL LAW GUIDE § 5.24 (2001-02 ed.).
70
1 For a discussion of the tax reduction factors that affect the ability of a school district to
collect its full charge-off amount, see 1 CAREY, supranote 169, §§ 5.24, 5.25.
171For an example of how phantom revenue works in practice, see GOVERNOR'S BLUE
RIBBON TASK FORCE ON FINANCING STUDENT SUCCESS IN OHIO ("GOVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE"), BUILDING A BETrER SCHOOL FUNDING SYSTEM 46 (2005). The report is available at
http://www.blueribbontaskforce.ohio.gov/02022005brtf.pdf.
172SEE OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.0216 (LexisNexis 2002).
173
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.022(A)(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2003).
16 OHIO
167OHIO
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teacher ratios 174 and student-educational personnel ratios; 75 and to
support districts offering specific programs for76 free lunch, adult basic
literacy, mentor teachers, and gifted students. 1
The two largest and most broadly applied adjustments are
disadvantaged pupil impact aid (DPIA) and parity aid. 77 DPIA
provides funding to school districts based on the number of enrolled
students whose families receive some type of state welfare
assistance. 178 DPIA funds must be used by schools to provide, among
other things, all-day kindergarten classes, safer schools, and remedial
academic programs. 79 Parity aid is calculated based on the average
amount that school districts with wealth per pupil in the upper tenth to
thirtieth percentiles spend above the minimum amount to finance the
local shares of an adequate education.' 80 It is allocated to the 490
school districts with the lowest wealth. Like DPIA funds, parity aid
must be spent on specific programs,' 81 such as lowering pupil-teacher
ratios, offering more advanced curriculum activities, and increasing
professional development. 82 The parity aid program was added to the
Foundation Program in fiscal year 2002, and was phased in to be fully
funded starting in fiscal year 2006.183
The foundation program also contains income guarantees for
school districts, ensuring that school districts receive a minimum
amount of funding regardless of the amount suggested by the base

74
1 Deductions

are made to the base cost formula for districts that have less than 1 teacher
for each 25 students. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.023(B)-(C) (Baldwin 2005).
175Educational service personnel include elementary school art, music, and physical
education teachers, counselors, librarians, visiting teachers, social workers, and nurses.
Deductions are made to the base cost formula for districts with less than five educational service
personnel per 1,000 students. Id. § 3317.023(D).
176For a complete list of programs for which additional money is appropriated for districts,
see id. at § 3317.024.
177 CAREY, supra note 169, § 5.43.
178School districts with less than the state average percentage of "disadvantaged pupil[s]"
receive a flat amount per student; school districts with concentrations higher than the state
average receive a higher amount per student, calculated according to the concentration of the
disadvantaged students. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.029(C) (Baldwin 2005).
1Id.

§ 3317.029(F).

180Currently, the amount of parity aid is calculated to be 9.5 mills of recognized valuation
times the difference between the district's wealth per pupil and the average wealth per pupil of
the 10 tf to 3 0 b districts with the highest wealth per pupil. Id. § 3317.0217(C)(2). Wealth is
defined as two-thirds times the district's recognized valuation and one-third the average
personal income of its residents. Wealth is then divided by the formula ADM to obtain the local
wealth per pupil for the school district. Id. § 3317.0217(A).
181This requirement is relaxed if the school district maintains an "excellent" or "effective"
rating. CAREY, supra note 169, § 5.43.2.
182OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3302.41 (Baldwin 2005).
183The parity aid program was to be flinded at 20% in FY 2002, 40% in FY 2003, 58% in
FY 2004, 76% in FY 2005, and at 100% in all fiscal years thereafter. Id. § 3317.0217(C) (1).
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cost formula and adjustments. These guarantees are limited to either
84
one or three fiscal years after the change triggering the guarantee.'
B. The FoundationProgram in Practice
Since the Foundation Program was first challenged, funding in the
program has risen substantially: 185
Diagram 1:
Foundation Program Funding, 1994-2005
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The precipitous increase between 2001 and 2002 was due to the
introduction of the parity aid program, which provided an additional
$97 million in funding in its first year. Although the parity aid
program continued to be phased in from Fiscal Year 2002-2005, the
reduction of the inventory tax, as well as the expiration of holdharmless guarantees after changes to the Foundation Program in
Fiscal Year 2002 served to minimize gains from the expansion of the
parity aid program.
A look at growth in Foundation Program funding relative to the
Consumer Price Index, a general measure of inflation, reveals a subtle
problem with the current Foundation Program: it is rather
unpredictable. Some years school funding grows far ahead of
inflation, while others it lags behind.
184
If the school district is consolidated or transfers property, the guarantee provides the
same amount of funding allocated to affected portions of district in the year prior to the change
for three fiscal years. Id. § 3317.04(A)-(B). If the guarantee provision is triggered by
reassessment by the county auditor, the guarantee is effective for one fiscal year. Id.
§ 3317.04(C)-(D).

15 Data in this section are from the Ohio Dept. of Educ., http://www.ode.state.oh.us

(follow "finance and grants" hyperlink; then follow "state funding for schools" hyperlink) (last

visited August 15, 2006), U.S. Dept. if Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/
data/home.htm (last visited August 15, 2006), and the author's own calculations.
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Diagram 2:
Growth in Foundation Formula Funding and Inflation,
1994-2005
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Variability in fiunding increases from year-to-year creates
substantial difficulty for school districts planning their budgets. In
years where the nominal increase in Foundation Program
funding
remains below the increase in inflation, school districts must
effectively plan for a real decrease in funding unless they are able to
alleviate the difference with local funds. This was the case in both
fiscal years 2004 and 2005, where more school districts were added to
the Fiscal Watch and Fiscal Emergency lists than during any other
two consecutive fiscal years since the state's fiscal accountability
program was implemented in the mid 1990s.186
Despite the variability of funding from the Foundation Program,
school districts must still plan for the future, and more than one out of
every three school districts in Ohio is anticipating a fiscal deficit
within three years. In October 2004, the Ohio Department of
Education summarized the five-year forecasts of all Ohio school
districts. The number of schools projecting current-year deficits rose
from 35 to 41, while 205 more school districts projected deficits
within three years. While not much different than the Fiscal Year
2004 report (in which 243 districts reported expected deficits within
a6 Nine districts were added to the Fiscal Watch list in FYs 2004-2005, while seven
schools were added to the Fiscal Emergency list. Duing the same time, only one school was
removed from either list. A school in fiscal watch has conditions threatening its financial
solvency and must develop a financial recovery plan approved by the State. If it cannot do so
and its fiscal condition worsens, it is downgraded to financial emergency, where the auditor of
the state assumes financial control of the district and may appoint a commission to replace the
board of education until the district's danger of insolvency is eliminated. For more information,
see
http:nwww.auditor.stat
e
-e
a Wats
ofr all hschlFatSheet.htm
(last visited April 29, 2005).
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three years), the number was significantly larger than the 157 districts
that expected deficits within three years in Fiscal Year 2003.187
Along with state funds, school districts continue to rely on
property taxes to fund their operations. Over the last five years, Ohio
school districts have turned to their voters 1,410 times in hopes of
maintaining or increasing their funding bases for operations through
renewed or increased property taxes, meeting with a 52.1% success
rate. Eliminating renewal levies, the success rate has been
considerably lower: only 38.7% of new and replacement levies were
approved. Recent elections suggest property owners are not more
willing than they have been in the past to grant school districts'
requests for increased taxes in the face of tightening budgets, layoffs,
and cutbacks in program offerings. In February 2005, new levies saw
a passage rate of 33.0%, and in May 2005, the passage rate was only
slightly better, at 38.7%.188
C. Ohio's FutureFundingSystem? The Governor'sProposals
Economic conditions in Ohio have continued to remain poor since
the last DeRolph decision, creating what Governor Taft has called
"very difficult economic times" that required him to reduce or hold
189
flat spending for most agencies in his 2006-2007 biennium budget.
When the governor released his budget in February 2006, headlines
from papers across the state lamented cuts in education. Cleveland's
Plain Dealer noted that "[m]any schools lose out in Taft's budget
plan," 190 while the Akron Beacon Journal lamented that "the
governor's budget plan for schools highlights the familiar flaws of a
sorry funding formula,"' 191 and the Dayton Daily News reported that
"funding schools put on hold again."' 92 At the same time, however,
87

The Ohio Department of Education's summary of five-year school district forecasts can
be viewed at http://www.ode.state.oh.us (follow "finance and grants" hyperlink, then follow
"finance related data" hyperlink, then follow "five-year financial forecasts" hyperlink, then
follow "Five-Year Forecast Projections and Assumptions") (last visited August 15, 2006), while
individual school district forecasts can be viewed at http://fyf.oecn.kl2.oh.us/fyforecast/ (last
visited April 29, 2005).
'88The Ohio Department of Education reports election results for school-related ballot
issues at http://www.ode.state.oh.us (follow "finance and grants" hyperlink, then follow "School
District Financial Status" hyperlink, then follow "Election Results" hyperlink) (last visited April
29,2005).
19 Executive Briefing Document for the 2006-2007 Biennium Budget, at 7, available at
http://www.oesca.org/resource/Executive%20Budget%/20Briefing/20Document.pdf.
190Reginald Fields & Kaye Spector, Many schools Lose out in Taft's Budget Plan, THE
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 18, 2005 at Al.
191
Editorial, Tinkering by Taft: The Governor's Budget Plan for Schools Highlights the
FamiliarFlaws of a Sorry FundingFormula,AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Feb. 20,2005 at B3.
192Editorial, FundingSchools Put on HoldAgain, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 10, 2005, at
A18.
1
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some headlines noted that improvement for the poorest of Ohio's
school districts was incorporated into the governor's plan. The
Columbus Dispatch reported that "Taft's plan would give poor
schools more funds, wealthier schools less,"'193 and even the usually
pessimistic Plain Dealer acknowledged
"Taft school budget gives
' 94
boost to low-income districts."'
1. The Blue Ribbon Task Force on FinancingStudent Success
The governor based his budget plan in part on recommendations
from his Blue Ribbon Task Force on Financing Student Success. The
Governor had convened the Task Force in 2003, and it issued its final
report in February 2005.195 Comprised of thirty-five professionals,
including politicians, local school board leaders, business leaders, and
academics, the Task Force identified its goal as developing "a school
funding system that maintains the shared state and local partnership to
raise sufficient revenue reliably and predictably, allocate funds fairly
and effectively, and spend resources efficiently and with
accountability."' 196 The Task Force issued 18 recommendations,
"strongly urging" policymakers to view the recommendations "as a
' 97
package, not as a menu of choices for selective implementation."'
Four recommendations of the Task Force most substantively
affected the current Foundation Program: Recommendations 1, 2, 3,
and 10. Recommendations 1 and 2 suggest changing the tax laws to
permit growth, within limits, of school levies commensurate with
increases in inflation and property valuations, as well as adjusting the
charge-off calculation to eliminate phantom revenue. 198 Changing the
tax law would require a
constitutional
amendment. 199
Recommendation 3 suggests revision of the tax code to reform the
tangible property tax in conjunction with "a mechanism to protect
schools from a precipitous loss in revenue they currently receive from
this tax., 200 Noting that the tangible property tax has been criticized
as hurting Ohio's competitiveness in attracting business to the state,
the Task Force acknowledged that the tax on inventory was already
being phased out and the General Assembly has considered the
19 3

Catherine Candisky, Cuts Loom for Ohio Schools; Taft's Plan Would Give Poorer
Schools More Funds, Wealthier Schools Less, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, February 18, 2005 at IA.
194
Reginald Fields, Taft school budget gives boost to low-income districts, THE PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), February 1I,2005, at A 17.
95

1 See GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 171.
196Id.at7.
197Id.at

2.
198
Id.at 25-26.
199
Id.at 46.
2001d. at 26.
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gradual elimination of the remaining tangible property tax.' ° Still, the
Task Force warned that an alternative revenue source must be
identified in reforming or eliminating the tangible property tax, as it
provided nearly $1.3 billion in funding to school districts in 2002,202
25.1% of the total state share of funding. Recommendation 10
suggests possible reallocation of the cost-of-doing-business (CODB)
factor in a manner that better directs funds to the districts whose
students are most in need.
The Task Force made one recommendation that part of the
Foundation Program remain completely intact: Recommendation 8
suggests that the parity aid program remain on its original phase-in
schedule and be fully funded in FY 2006.
In evaluating the possible costs of its bundle of proposals, the Task
Force calculated that the recommendations would provide roughly
$178 million in additional funding to school districts in the first year
of implementation, with approximately 72% of that increase coming
from state revenues and the remainder from local property tax
increases under the plan.2 °3 In the fourth year of implementation, the
additional money provided school districts would be roughly $696
million more than the current law provides, with state revenues
providing 83% of the increase. 2 4
2. The Governor's Budget Proposal
Despite the Task Force's warning that its recommendations should
be considered a package (not a menu), the Governor did not
incorporate all the Task Force's recommendations into his 2006-2007
biennium budget proposal. The most obvious omission of the Task
Force's recommendations was the Governor's failure to request
consideration of the constitutional amendment permitting the growth
of property taxes collected under school levies to grow with inflation
and reappraisal. In speaking about the proposal, Governor Taft made
it clear he would support the amendment only if the education
community first gathered the bulk of support required for passage of
the amendment. °5

201GOVERNOR'S
2

TASK FORCE, supra note 171, at 24.

02Id.
20
3 Id.at 55.
204Id. at 56.
205

Catherine Candisky & Mary Bridgeman, Taft Wants Allies for School-Funding Idea,
'Enthusiastic'supportfrom educators neededfor amendment, he says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
February 3, 2005, at IA (reporting on Taft's goal of including educators in the decision to raise
real estate taxes).
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The substantive changes to the Foundation Program in the
Governor's budget include the complete elimination of the cost-ofdoing-business factor in FY 2006. In FY 2004, the CODB factor's
inclusion in the Foundation Formula accounted for roughly $372
million in aid to districts.2 °6 The Governor's plan promises that school
districts will be held 100% harmless relative to their FY 2005 level of
state funding in FY 2006 and held 98% harmless in FY 2007 for any
losses they will incur from the elimination of the CODB factor, but
providing no guarantees beyond FY 2007 for the changes.2 °7
The Governor also proposed slowing the phase-in of the parity aid
program, offering funding for the program at 80% in FY2006 and
85% in FY2007, °8 in direct conflict with the Task Force's
recommendation that the program be fully funded as originally
planned when it was enacted in 2002. The Ohio Legislative
Commission estimates that the difference in Parity Aid, should the
Governor's proposal be accepted, would result in the Parity Aid
program being funded at approximately $100 million less than
originally planned in FY 2006 and $85 million less in FY 2007.
Consistent with the Task Force's recommendation, the Governor's
budget proposed the acceleration of the phase-out of the inventory
component of the property tax, as well as the two-year phase-out of
the machinery and equipment component of the property tax. 20 9 The
Governor's plan promises to hold districts 100% harmless for the
revenue losses due to elimination of the two components of the
personal property tax until FY 2011.210 The effect of this
recommendation varies widely across districts; the percentage of local
operating revenue generated through the tax on tangible personal
property differs across Ohio's school districts, ranging from 0.1% to
54.8%, with 142 districts relying on the tax for more than 20% of
their local operating revenues. 21' The machinery and equipment
206 Ohio

Legislative Service Commission, 2005 Red Book for Department of Education at

12.
207 Executive Budget Briefing Document for Gov. Bob Taft's Budget, FY 2006-2007 at 24
(prepared
by the Office of Budget and Management).
20

81d. at 25.

209Id.

at 14 (proposing the creation of new commercial taxes).

210Executive Budget Briefing Document, FY 2006-2007 at 26. The tangible personal

property tax is comprised of three components: inventories, which comprise roughly 39 % of
tangible personal property tax revenues; machinery and equipment, which comprise roughly
34% of tangible personal property tax revenues; and furniture and fixtures, which comprise
roughly 27% of tangible personal property tax revenues. After the Governor's proposed phaseouts, only the furniture and fixtures component of the tangible personal property tax will
remain. See Ohio Legislative Service Commission, 2005 Red Book for Department of
Education at 20.
211 Ohio Legislative Service Commission, 2005 Red Book for Department of Education at
19 (explaining that the taxes may be more important to some school districts than to others).
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component of the tangible personal property tax provided more than
$383 million to school districts in tax year 2003.212
The Governor proposed the introduction of a Commercial Activity
Tax (CAT) to replace the lost revenues from the change in property
213
taxes, but not all of the CAT will be allocated to school districts.

3. What Does the Governor'sProposalMean
in Dollar Terms to
214
Districts?
School
On balance, the governor's budget proposed funding for the
Foundation Program of $6.15 billion in FY 2006, and $6.29 billion in
FY 2007.215 The increases equal 2.5% and 2.3%, respectively, figures
equal to outside economic projections for inflation in the
corresponding years, 216 effectively holding the Foundation Program at
a flat funding level in real economic terms. That the program is being
held at flat funding does not reveal the complete story, however: one
needs to examine the effect of the plan on individual school districts
to gain an idea of how the plan will work.
The Ohio Office of Budget and Management issued its projections
on how the Governor's plan would affect each of the school districts
in Ohio.2 17 A cursory glance of the data shows that 439 districts are
slated to receive no increase or an increase less than the expected
increase in inflation in FY 2006, an effective decrease in funding
from the foundation program in real economic terms. Roughly the
same number will experience a real economic loss in funding in FY
2007. As can be seen from the table below, the effect of the plan
differs depending on the property wealth of the school district:

21d. at 20. Ohio's tax year runs concurrently with the calendar year, as opposed to Ohio's

fiscal year of July I to June 30.
213Executive Budget Briefing Document, FY 2006-2007 at 26 (explaining that districts
will not be accountable for revenue losses until 2011).

214Data in this section are from the Ohio Office of Management

and Budget,

http://www.obm.ohio.gov), and the Ohio Department of Education's School Finance,
http://www.ode.state.oh.us/school_finance.
215Executive Budget Briefing Document, FY 2006-2007 at 23 (increasing funding by
approximately 2.4% per year).
216Blue Chip Economic Indicators,April 10, 2005 (Aspen Publishers).
217http://www.obm.ohio.gov/budget/executive/0607/bb0607_foundation.pdf
(last visited

April 29, 2005).
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Table 1: Expected Impact of Governor Taft's Proposed
Changes to the Foundation Program
Average Property
Valuation per
Pupil, 2003 taxyear

Average
Spending per
Pupil, FY
2004

Expected
Change from
Governor's plan,
FY 2006

Expected
Change from
Governor's
plan, FY 2007

$37,683.70

$8,018.60

3.5%

3.1%

$419,516.33

$13,420.33

0.0%

-2.0%

$94,613.50

$10,994.75

0.7%

3.5%

Lowest Quintile

$63,929.54

$7,850.52

3.1%

2.2%

SecondQuintile

$86,439.37

$7,706.43

2.6%

1.5%

Middle Quintile

$103,571.35

$7,674.11

2.0%

1.4%

Fourth Quintile

$131,895.61

$7,961.53

1.2%

0.4%

$207,422.34

$9,366.54

0.6%

-1.1%

Property-Poorest 10
Property-Wealthiest 10

The"Big 8"

All Districts, ranked by
property valuation per pupil

Highest

Quintile

Figures in bold denote nominal increases in foundation funding
below the expected rate of inflation, suggesting decreases in funding
in real economic terms. According to the Governor's projections, on
average, only the school districts in the lowest 40% of rankings by
property taxable property per pupil will have increases above
expected inflation in fiscal year 2006, while in fiscal year 2007, on
average, none of the quintiles will experience foundation funding
growth above expected inflation.
The governor's plan yields some odd results: for example, the socalled "Big 8" school districts (Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown) together will receive
an increase in foundation funding less than inflation in fiscal year
2006. Examined individually, the Akron, Columbus, Cincinnati, and
Dayton school districts all are slated for no increase in foundation
formula funds in 2006. Cincinnati is slated for a 2% decrease in 2007.
Results for individual school districts are also interesting. For
example, East Cleveland School District (Cuyahoga County), with
one of the highest concentrations of students qualifying for DIPA
funding and falling in the lowest quintile when ranking the districts
by property valuation, will receive no increase in funding in 2006 and
a 2% decrease in funding in 2007 despite the already severe fiscal
problems it suffers as indicated by its Fiscal Emergency status. In
sharp contrast, Woodridge Local School District (Summit County),
with the sixteenth highest property valuation per pupil and spending
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over $9,500 per pupil, will receive a 7.7% increase in FY 2006 and an
additional 5.8% increase in 2007.
D. The Legislature'sResponse: House Bill 66
The General Assembly submitted the main operating budget2 18 for
the state to the Governor for his signature on June 29, 2005.219 The
Governor signed the bill into law (with some item vetoes) on June
30.220

The General Assembly incorporated Governor Taft's suggested
revisions to the state's taxing structure into the budget, creating the
corporate activity tax and beginning the phase-out of both the
inventory and manufacturing machinery and equipment components
of the tangible personal property tax.221 The General Assembly then
went beyond the Governor's recommendation regarding the reduction
of tangible personal property tax: although the Governor suggested
leaving the furniture and fixtures tax in tact, the General Assembly
voted to phase-out this component of the tangible personal property
tax as well, resulting in the complete elimination of the tangible
personal property tax by tax year 2009.222
The General Assembly also made four significant changes to
calculations in the Foundation Program: it reduced the number of
mills used to compute parity aid, effectively lowering the amount of
parity aid available to districts;

223

it eliminated the state aid
225

guarantee; it began phasing out the cost of doing business factor,
and it altered the method for calculating the formula amount (the cost
of a base education).2 26
224

218Am. Sub. H.B. No. 66, effective June 30, 2005, available at http://www.legislature.
state.oh.us/BillTextl26/126_HB_66_ENI N.html (last visited August 25, 2005).
219Ohio Legislative Service Commission, House Bill Status Report of Legislation for
House Bill 66, 126th General Assembly, available at http://lsc.state.oh.us/coderev/houl26.nsf/
House+Bill+Number/0066?OpenDocument
(last visited August 25, 2005).
220
Id. For a list of vetoed items and explanation, see Press Release, Office of Governor
Taft, "Taft Signs Budget Reforming Ohio Tax Code," June 30, 2005, available at
http://governor.ohio.gov/releases/063005BudgetBill.htm.
221The corporate activity tax will be codified in Chapter 5751 of the Ohio Revised Code,
while the changes to the tangible personal property taxes will be codified at Ohio Rev. Code
5711.22.
Am. Sub. H.B. No. 66, supranote 218, §§ 5751.01-5751.98 and § 5711.22.
22
21d. § 5711.22
223Prior to July 1, 2005, parity aid was calculated 9.5 mills times the difference between
the district's wealth per pupil and the average wealth per pupil of the lot, to 30"&districts with
the highest wealth per pupil. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.023(B)-(C). Commencing July 1,
2005, parity aid will be calculated as 7.5 mills times the difference between the district's wealth
per pupil and the average wealth per pupil of the 10 th to 30t hdistricts with the highest wealth per
pupil. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 66, supra note 218, § 3317.0217(C).
24 Id. (repealing OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.0212, containing the state aid guarantee).
2- Id. § 3317.017(N).
6
ld. §3317.012(A)-(D).
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Instead of calculating the cost of a base education using the
expenditures model that was in effect prior to FY 2006, the cost of a
base education is now calculated by summing the cost of "building
blocks." In particular, the General Assembly has determined the cost
of classroom teachers, other personnel support, and non-personnel
support necessary for an adequate education.2 27 Then, funds for large
group intervention, 22 professional development, 229 data-based
decision making, 230 and professional development regarding databased decision making 231 are added to calculated cost of the building
blocks to derive the formula amount for each school district.
E. Application of the Positive "Thorough and Efficient"
Standard
Given the anticipated effects of the Governor's plan, the budget as
enacted by the General Assembly, as well as the known progress of
students under the current funding scheme, are Ohio's current and
proposed financing systems "thorough and efficient?"
As discussed above, jurisprudence from Ohio and other states
share common themes regarding the meaning of "thorough and
efficient." These themes are:
(1)The legislature must provide a statewide systemevidence of only a few "failing" districts is not sufficient to
trigger a declaration of unconstitutionality.
(2) The state must identify minimum academic standards that
identify a "base" education, and ensure that those standards
are met. Articulated academic standards should, at a
minimum, include targets for math, reading, writing, science,
and civics.
(3) While legislatures can require local subdivisions to share
funding responsibility through local tax provisions, the state
must ensure that all subdivisions receive at least the cost of a
base education for each pupil.
(4) A thorough and efficient system only requires equality of
spending to the extent that a cost of base education is
§ 3317.012(A).
§ 3317.012(C)(1).
9 Am. Sub. H.B. No. 66, supra note 218, § 3317.012(C)(2).
231d § 3317.012(C)(3).
231Id § 3317.012(C)(4).
2271d.
2

2 81d.
22
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provided for each student. School districts with adequate
means may spend beyond the base amount if they so choose.
(5)A "thorough and efficient" education entails not just
meeting academic standards, but also providing safe facilities
in which students can learn.
The data available on the condition of school buildings in Ohio are
limited, so this Note will not discuss the fifth element. Similarly,
because the Ohio Supreme Court has never objected to the school
financing scheme on the grounds that it was not a statewide system,
this note presumes the first obligation would be met.
First, then, is the issue of standards. The State of Ohio has
articulated its academic standards in the Ohio Revised Code: the
performance indicators outlined in section 3317.012(B)(1) set forth
graduation and attendance rates, and minimum percentages of
students in the fourth, sixth, ninth, tenth, and twelfth grades that
should score "proficient" or better on standardized mathematics,
reading, writing, citizenship, and science 233
tests. 32 The table below
results.
year
academic
shows the 2003-2004
Table 2: Percentage of Ohio Students Scoring "Proficient" or
Better on State Proficiency Tests
4th Graders

6th Graders

9th Graders-

12thGraders

Target

Actual

Target

Actual

Target

Actual

Citizenship

75.0

59.4

75.0

67.9

85.0

92.1

-

-

Mathematics

75.0

65.8

75.0

65.6

85.0

84.5

75.0

68.4

Reading

75.0

70.8

75.0

64.6

85.0

95.7

75.0

78.5

Science

75.0

64.4

75.0

63.1

85.0

88.3

-

-

Writing

75.0

78.6

75.0

90.3

85.0

95.8

-

Target

Actual

* The 9th Grade proficiency tests were administered to 10th Graders in 2003-2004.

While the proficiency test results suggest that the secondary
education being provided students might be "thorough and efficient"
according to the academic standards set by the state, the dismal
achievement of fourth and sixth grade students suggests this is not
true at the elementary school level (breaking these scores down into
ethnic minorities and students from "disadvantaged" backgrounds
shows even poorer passage rates).234 Regardless of the funding
structure, the outcome indicates Ohio's system through FY 2005 was
232OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3317.012(B) (1) (a)-(aa) (West 2005).
2332003-2004 State of Ohio Report Card, http://www.ode.state.oh.us/reportcard/state
reportcard (visited April 29, 2005).
234Id.
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not "thorough and efficient" in providing an adequate education. No
program in the Governor's budget is targeted to improving
proficiency scores,235 suggesting the funding system under his plan
would be similarly deficient in this area. It is unclear whether the
data-based decision making funding enacted by the General
Assembly will adequately address the issue of standards.
Failure of Ohio students to meet state-articulated minimum
standards aside, the funding system would likely also fail the funding
characteristics of the positive "thorough and efficient" standard. The
Foundation Formula base cost of educating a student was studied and
established in 2001 based on 1999 data, and has been adjusted for
inflation each fiscal year at pre-determined rates between 2.1% and
2.8%, without any reevaluation of actual costs or actual inflation.
Since 2001, the base cost formula has increased 7.37%, while
inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has risen
8.66%.236 As the Governor's task force noted, however, CPI inflation
is not the appropriate measure to use when determining the change in
the base cost. 237 Because approximately 85% of the average school
district's budget is employee compensation, which is comprised of
wages and benefits, the Employment Cost Index (ECI) should be
factored into the base cost adjustments, as well. 238 From 2001-2005,
the ECI for state and local government employees increased
14.75%,239 double the amount anticipated by the General Assembly in
setting the base cost inflation factors through 2005. The mechanism to
adjust the base cost set in 2001 arguably underestimates the cost of an
adequate education in each year thereafter, and the funding formula
that relies on it necessarily does the same. That more than one-third of
Ohio's school districts either currently face or will face spending
deficits within the next three fiscal years also suggests the current
funding formula is not funding an adequate education. Failure to
guarantee school districts minimum base cost funding that equals the
actual cost of providing an adequate education in the current fiscal
year violates the fiscal principles of the positive "thorough and
efficient" standard.
235The Governor's plan does allocate funds for the "continued development of
achievement and diagnostic tests," including new math, reading, social studies. New tests could
change the proficiency outcomes. The Governor also promotes the development of model
curricula in his budget, but the areas of focus are foreign language, fine arts, and technology,
areas not reflected in the proficiency tests. Executive Budget Briefing Document, FY 20062007 at 27.
236U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov.
237 GOVERNOR'S
238

TASK FORCE, supra note 171, at 28.

d.
239U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov.
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If the current funding formula fails to meet the "thorough and
efficient" mandate of the constitution, the Governor's plan most
certainly fails to do so as well. Although the Governor's plan does
calculate the increase in base cost for FY 2006 according to the
modified price measure considering the ECI as well as the CPI
recommended by the task force, it uses the General Assembly's FY
2005 figure as its base, which, as noted above, does not reflect the
cost of an adequate education in FY 2005. Further, as discussed
earlier, the Governor's plan actually cuts funding in real economic
terms for more than two-thirds of Ohio school districts in both FY
2006 and FY 2007.
While the figure for the base cost of an adequate education using
the building blocks methodology set by the General Assembly in FY
2006 is presumptively valid,240 the inflation adjustment to the figure
for FY 2007 creates the same problem endemic to the previous
system and the governor's plan: it underestimates growth in costs.
Although its inflation adjustment is now split between personnel and
nonpersonnel costs, the adjustment to personnel costs is 2.3% for
2007,241 a figure significantly below the projected average
compensation growth of 4.1%.242
The Governor's plan to slow the phasing-in of Parity Aid,
something both the Task Force and the Ohio Supreme Court said
were necessary to ensure adequate education in poorer districts, also
suggests his plan would not adequately fund Ohio schools. Although
the General Assembly did not slow the phase-in of the Parity Aid
program, its decision to lower the millage rate from which parity aid
is calculated reduces the amount of aid available to schools, funding
the program at a level lower than anticipated by both the Task Force
and the Ohio Supreme Court.
Finally, the Governor's suggested elimination of Foundation
Program funding through the acceleration of the elimination of the
inventory tax and the elimination of the tangible tax on machinery
and equipment without guarantee of a replacement revenue stream
seems to seriously jeopardize the state's ability to simply maintain
funding to school districts (even if it is redistributed) at arguably
inadequate levels. 243 Most certainly the General Assembly's complete
240

The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that policy determinations manifested in legislation

(such as the cost of an adequate education) are presumptively valid. See DeRolph 1, 677 N.E.2d
733, 737 (Ohio 1997) (stating, "We are aware that the General Assembly has the responsibility
to enact legislation and that such legislation is presumptively valid").
241 Am. Sub. H.B. No. 66, supra note 218, § 317.012(B)(2).
242 Blue Chip Economic Indicators, ECONOMETRIC DETAIL, Vol. 2 1, No. 3, September 10,

2005.

243Districts

are only held 100% harmless in FY 2006, and at 98% in FY 2007, without any
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elimination of all tangible personal property taxes causes the same
uncertainty regarding revenue streams.
All three systems have deficiencies that must be addressed before
Ohio's system of public schools under them could be considered
constitutional under the positive "thorough. and efficient" standard.
The problems with the structure of the systems, however, are not so
great that they cannot be overcome. Optimally, the General Assembly
should undertake a study of the cost of adequate education every five
years, to be certain it captures the changing costs of technologies,
textbooks, and other inputs to education. It would then need to review
the inflation adjustment proposed in each budget cycle to ensure the
projected figure was in-line with actual inflation growth. With change
to the base cost formula adjustment procedure, the Foundation
Formula would likely cover the minimal cost of an adequate
education: the gap aid payments eliminate the problem of phantom
revenue, DPIA payments assist school districts in meeting the needs
of their disadvantaged pupils, and parity aid payments permit less
wealthy school districts the opportunity to make discretionary outlays
to improve offerings where their students need it most.
While structurally sound, the system would not be constitutional
unless it actually funded school districts at the mandated level. Both
the Governor's plan and the system enacted by the General Assembly
create uncertainty in funding by eliminating revenue streams and only
partially replacing them. The Governor's plan also creates a problem
in that it decreases in funding expected for two-thirds of the school
districts once the figures are inflation-adjusted. While most of the
wealthier school districts will be unaffected by the change, poorer
school districts, such as East Cleveland, most certainly will not be
able to absorb the loss. The General Assembly failed to issue revenue
projections for school districts; it is unclear whether this problem
remains under the newly-enacted system. The General Assembly's
modification to the parity aid program, however, is likely to reduce
the amount of money available to poorer districts.
Regarding the failure of the school system to meet academic
standards, analysis of the strategies successful schools implement
should be conducted, as should research on the specific needs of the
groups that fail to perform well, such as disadvantaged students. As
the Governor suggested, the testing tools should also be studied for

guarantee beyond that, and the Governor's lack of specificity regarding the portion of the CAT
to be attributed to the Foundation Program does not suggest solid funding for the program from
this tax.
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defects or biases that might disadvantage student populations within
the testing group.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Thirteen years ago, the DeRolph case began a highly charged
debate over the constitutionality of Ohio's Foundation Program. Four
Supreme Court decisions failed to provide a positive definition of the
Ohio Constitution's Thorough and Efficient Clause, and the General
Assembly's attempts to create a system that met the constitutional
mandate fell short. The case concluded with the Supreme Court
relinquishing jurisdiction over the dispute, without ever issuing a
finding that the system of funding in Ohio was constitutional.
The themes in DeRolph, combined with the themes from
jurisprudence of other state high courts, suggest a positive "thorough
and efficient" standard for public education. The positive standard
requires a statewide system, in which the state serving at least as
guarantor of a minimum level of funding that is sufficient to permit
school districts to provide a base education that meets articulated
academic standards in math, science, reading, writing, and civics.
While equality is required up to the level of a base education, the state
need not ensure equality of funding beyond the base education
funding level.
The Ohio School Foundation Program in its FY 2005 form is
arguably the closest incarnation of a "thorough and efficient" system
the General Assembly has created to date, but still needs slight
modification to ensure the base amount used in the funding formula
actually reflects the base cost of an adequate education and to ensure
students actually obtain an adequate education as measured by state
testing programs. The Governor's proposed modifications to the
Funding Formula, as well as the plan enacted by the General
Assembly for FYs 2006-07 seem to have potential to move Ohio
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further away from a constitutionally "thorough and efficient" system,
by reducing funding for poorer districts and placing the revenue
streams that fund the Foundation Program in question.
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